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Selection Policy and Immigrants’ Remittance Behaviour
* 
 
This paper analyses the impact of a change in Australia’s immigration policy, introduced in 
the mid-1990s, on migrants’ remittance behaviour. More precisely, we compare the 
remittance behaviour of two cohorts who entered Australia before and after the policy 
change, which consists of stricter entry requirements. The results indicate that those who 
entered under more stringent conditions – the second cohort – have a lower probability to 
remit but, if remitting, they tend to remit, on average, a higher amount than those in the first 
cohort. We also find significant time and region effects. Contrary to some existing evidence, 
time spent in Australia positively affects the probability to remit while in terms of regional 
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International migration from developing countries is often linked to expectations of 
mutual gains for the migrants and their home and host countries. Migrants benefit if the net 
return to their skills is higher in the host country than in their home country. The immigration 
of workers allows receiving countries to fill domestic labour market shortages and provide 
host country employers the private benefit to meet productive capacity without large hikes in 
wages. This is particularly so when domestic labour shortages are skill-specific and when 
migration policy is tuned to select such skills to grant entry into the country, as is the case in 
Australia.  
Recent literature has highlighted the importance of remittances as ‘compensation’ for 
a potential brain drain from the sending countries. The aggregate value of remittances is 
larger than those of common commodities traded, and most sending countries appear to 
receive substantial inflows (e.g. Philippines, Mexico, the Pacific islands, North Africa). 
However, it has also been highlighted that more skilled migrants tend to remit less than those 
with lower levels of education, leading to the implication that the brain drain is not properly 
compensated for when more educated leave the country. 
Understanding the conditions that affect the remittance pattern of migrants is 
important to contextualise the net benefits of migration. For instance, one of the benefits from 
the sending country’s perspective is that remittances help the recipient family to fund 
consumption as well as invest proportion of the transferred funds to start a business, 
especially when credit markets are not properly developed. From the host country 
perspective, the economic benefits of migration include meeting the spare capacity in the 
labour market; impact on the fiscal policy in terms of, for instance, tax receipt from the new 
arrivals, especially in the presence of declining native population.  
One of the best ways to achieve these objectives is through a proper economic (and of 
course social as well) assimilation of immigrants in the host country. These aspects are 
usually fulfilled by relatively higher skilled migrants as they tend to migrate with their 
immediate families and consequently are less likely to remit and save more in the host 
country, thus in an economic sense behaving more like natives. Therefore, migration 
admission policy not only has a direct impact on skill composition of new immigrants but 
also an indirect impact on their assimilation process, particularly on their saving/remittance 
behaviour. The reason to single out the remittance behaviour only is that, as discussed above, 
it has a direct impact on the sending countries, not only on family left behind but also from 
the point of view of compensation for the brain drain from the sending countries. 3 
 
Existing work on migrant remittances and their effect on the economies of developing 
nations have rarely focused on the conditions that affect migrants’ remittance pattern. These 
typically analyse the underlying motivations to remit. For instance, in the presence of 
uncertainty about their legal status and/or labour market conditions migrants could potentially 
remit more because of the insurance motive rather than, say, the altruistic motive (see 
Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2004; Piracha and Zhu, 2007). These motivations could indeed 
be affected by the change in conditions in the host country, particularly a change in the 
immigration policy as that has an implication for immigrants’ legal status. The main 
argument here is that the net benefits of migration are subject to the policy shift in both 
sending and receiving countries.  
However, there is limited research examining the effect of a change of policy  on 
remittance behaviour. We contribute to the scant literature by looking at the impact of a  
change in Australia’s immigrant admission policies, in mid-1990s, on migrants’ remittance 
flows.
1.. We compare the remittance behaviour of two cohorts who entered Australia at 
different points in time. The first cohort entered Australia between 1993 and 1995, just before 
the policy change while the second one entered in 1999–2000, after the policy change. The 
main difference between the two cohorts is the change in the entry requirements. Entry 
conditions after 1996 were more stringent in terms of skills (education and work experience) 
and knowledge of English. Post-1996 immigrants had neither income support for the first two 
years after migration, nor subsidies to attend English classes. As a result, those entering under 
work visa category in 1999 were more educated and had better English language skills than 
the previous cohort. We use this policy change to quantify the impact on immigrants’ 
remittance behaviour. In particular, we estimate the effect of the policy change on the 
probability and the level of remittances. 
Recent literature that has analysed the economic effect of the change in Australian 
immigration policy using the LSIA has almost exclusively concentrated on the labour market 
performance of immigrants. For instance, Cobb-Clark (2000, 2004) highlights that 
immigrants selected under the new immigration regime fare better in the labour market than 
those to whom the policy change does not apply (family reunification and refugees). 
Chiswick and Miller (2006) arrive to a similar conclusion attributing the effect of the positive 
labour market outcome to a better selection on the knowledge of the host country’s language 
                                                            
1 Although this change coincides with a change in the political party governing the country (from labour to 
conservative), we restrict our analysis to the economic effect of the change in migration policy. It should also be 




2 However, none of these papers study the impact of policy change on immigrants’ 
remittances flows.  
Our results show that the policy change had an impact on both the probability and the 
level of remittances. The results indicate that those who entered under more stringent 
conditions – the second cohort – have a lower probability to remit but, if remitting, tend to 
remit, on average, a higher amount than those in the first cohort. We also find significant time 
and region effects. Contrary to some existing evidence, time spent in Australia positively 
affects the probability to remit while in terms of regional effects, South Asians remit the 
highest amount.   
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Discussion on the background on 
immigration policy in Australia is presented in Section 2. Description of the data used 
appears in Section 3 while Section 4 discusses the empirical methodology. The estimation 
results are analysed in Section 5. Concluding remarks appear in the last section. 
 
 
2.  Background of Immigration Policy  
To understand the development of policies leading to the changes in the mid-1990s, 
one needs to put some context to Australia’s immigration policy. In 1972 Australia formally 
ended a migration policy based on ethnicity (‘white Australia policy’), replacing it with a 
focus on economic conditions to a limited number of workers in occupations where there was 
unmet demand.
3 Eliminating racial discrimination from immigration selection resulted in 
increasing numbers of applicants and refugees from non-European countries and 
consequently  higher stocks of immigrants with non-English speaking background (NESB). 
As an example Australia has taken refugees from conflicts in Chile (1973), Northern Cyprus 
(1974), Lebanon (1976-1983), Vietnam (1976-1982), Thailand (1976), East Timor (1977), 
Sri Lanka and El Salvador (1983) and the former Yugoslavia (1994). 
Until the policy change introduced in 1996 and analysed in this paper, two major 
trends have characterized immigration policy in Australia. First, the development of a 
systematic approach to immigration selection based on current labour market conditions. This 
                                                            
2 There is a related literature using Canadian and US data. Jasso and Rosenzweig (1995) and Green (1995; 
1999) respectively show that those who entered on the basis of skills are more likely to enter skilled occupations 
in the United States and Canada. Entry class is also related to immigrant earnings. Employment-based 
immigrants to the United States have higher initial earnings (Sorensen, et al., 1992; Duleep and Regets, 1996), 
while the fraction of individuals entering Canada as independent migrants is positively related to average entry 
wages (Wright and Maxim, 1993).  
3 This was in addition to the priority given to family reunification. 5 
 
took place during the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s with the introduction of the 
Numerical Multifactor Assessment System (NUMAS) during 1979-1982, which selected 
immigrants on the basis of family ties, occupational and language skills, and the points test 
(since 1988) which was used to set annually a minimum pass mark to be eligible for 
migration based on the skill level (qualifications and work experience), age and English 
language proficiency. Points could be gained if the applicant was qualified to work in one of 
the occupations listed in a Priority Occupation List, which summarises employers’ views and 
recruitment difficulties. Pre-migration English-language testing for particular occupations 
(chosen annually) was also introduced in 1989, first in the medical and nursing professions 
and then extending to 114 professions between 1991 and 1993 (Hawthorne, 1997; 2006), 
with points provided for both speaking and writing language abilities. Since 1988 the 
migration program is divided into three streams, ‘family reunification’, ‘skill’, and 
‘humanitarian’, with the ‘skill’ stream contributing about one third of all migrants to 
Australia until 1995-96.  
The second trend has been the development of policies to favour the settlement and 
participation of migrants, especially if from NESB, to Australia’s economic activity. This 
was accompanied by the introduction of instruments, including ad hoc data collections, to 
analyse their economic outcomes. Even with higher skill levels than comparable natives or 
migrants with an English-speaking background (Watson, 1996), NESB immigrants were 
characterized by substantially lower economic outcomes. To overcome a linguistic 
disadvantage, Australia had put in place a publicly funded system to provide new adult NESB 
immigrants with free language courses (as well as locally-funded technical training). 
Immigrants were paid to attend these courses, which lasted between one and six months and 
led them to attain a level of language ability that was adequate for employment. By 1990, 
Australia’s Adult Migrant English Program (AMEP) “was the largest government-funded 
English teaching program for migrants worldwide, catering to over 70,000 immigrants per 
year including large number of unemployed professionals” (Hawthorne, 2006 p.675-676). 
The government actively pursued the private sector to adopt Equal Opportunity principles 
towards NESB as well as facilitated to ease the admission of ‘professionals’ from NESB 
(managed by professional associations) with the funding of specialist labour market programs 
designed to prepare NESB professionals for mandatory entry exams in a range of professions 
like medicine, engineering and nursing. 6 
 
In 1996 a newly elected government introduced a number of significant changes to the 
migration policy, affecting the skill and family reunification but not the humanitarian 
streams. This new policy: 
(1) Abolished the social security benefit to new immigrants in the first two years after 
their arrival, as well as access to the Adult Migrant English Program  (whose costs 
were now to be met by the immigrant) and labour market programs (whose costs were 
to be repaid after securing work); 
(2) Allocated the highest points weighting to employability factors, namely occupational 
skills, education, age, and English language ability. Age-related points for applicants 
over the age of 45 were abolished while bonus points were awarded to those with 
relevant Australian or international professional work experience, a job offer, a 
spouse meeting the skill application criteria, an Australian sponsor who had to 
provide a guarantee, and carrying A$100,000 or more in capital. By 2001 most 
migrants to Australia were in the skill stream; 
(3) Introduced additional points for occupations in demand in addition to degree-level 
specific (as opposed to generic) qualifications, and bonus points for qualifications 
obtained recently in Australia; 
(4) Pre-migration qualification screening was effectively outsourced to professional 




3.  The Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Australia  
The Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants in Australia (LSIA) was commissioned in the 
early 1990s to fulfil the need to have better information on the settlement of new migrants 
than those available through censuses. The LSIA survey is based on a representative sample 
of 5% of migrants/refugees from successive cohorts of migrants. The data was primarily 
designed to study the process of immigrant settlement. The LSIA comprises three surveys 
over a period of almost 10 years: LSIA1 was conducted in 1993-1995 and contains three 
waves, with immigrants interviewed at 6 month intervals. LSIA2 has two waves, with 
immigrants interviewed 6 months after arrival and then 18 months after arrival (June 1999, 
June 2000). LSIA3 has only one wave; with interviews conducted in 2003-2004.
4  The LSIA 
                                                            
4 The new policy also reduced funding for the LSIA data collection. 7 
 
contains more than 300 questions about the decision to migrate and the subsequent 
experience after arrival in Australia. 
The LSIA data oversamples some groups of individuals based notably on visa categories. 
The refugee category is overrepresented in the samples but weights are available to recover 
population statistics and estimates. 
There are more than 300 questions about the settlement process in each wave of the 
survey. It is a detailed data set which is particularly useful to disentangle the impact of policy 
change in Australia. Questions were asked both to the primary applicants (aged 15 and 
above) and the migrating-unit spouses. In addition to questions about personal and family 
characteristics, education and past employment status , it also asks questions about monetary 
transfers to the home country. LSIA3, which was carried out after the policy change, has not 
only one wave but a dramatically reduced number of questions as well. This makes it 
inappropriate to use in our analysis. Hence the estimation sample in this paper is restricted to 
LSIA1 and LSIA2. First wave of LSIA1 is based on 5192 primary applicants and 1838 
migrating-unit spouses while a further 3124 primary applicants and 1094 migrating-unit 
spouses were included in wave 1 of LSIA2.
5  Figures 1 and 2 present the comparison between 
and across the two cohorts for each wave of interviews.  
Comparing migrants from cohort 1 and 2, we see that there is an increase in the business 
stream group, an increase in the independent stream group; a small decrease in family 
migrants and a fall in the humanitarian streams (see Table 1). Regional breakdown of 
migrants in LSIA 1 and LSIA 2 shows that the proportion in each cohort for the following 
groups of countries increased: Oceania, Middle East, North East Asia (which includes China 
and Hong Kong), South Asia and Africa (See Table 2) 
In regards to the human capital characteristics of the migrants, the second cohort had in 
general better education levels than the first cohort. The comparison between cohorts 
presented in Table 3 shows that cohort 2 tends to have a higher educational qualifications, 
especially with higher university degrees at the time of arrival.  
In terms of labour market outcome in Australia, Table 4 shows that wage employees are 
biggest group across the cohorts though the second cohort has a much bigger number in 
employment both in wave 1 (6 months after arrival) and wave 2 (18 months after arrival) than 
the first cohort. Moreover, unemployment number is lower for second cohort (about half of 
cohort 1 migrants’ unemployment rate on arrival), not only in comparison between first 
                                                            
5 Migrating unit is this context includes all members of the family migrating to Australia under the same visa 
application. The term spouses is used for husband/wife, civil partners, fiancé(e)s etc.  8 
 
waves of both cohorts but even between wave 1 of cohort 1 and wave 3 of cohort 2. The 
percentage of business owners is also larger in the second cohort with 5% of the immigrant 
population for cohort 2 compared to 3% for cohort 1 on arrival. Regarding the percentage of 
students and those not in the labour force, cohort 1 and 2 are comparable on arrival. 
Tables 5 to 8 provide summary statistics on migrants’ remittance behaviour across 
cohorts. Table 5 shows that the percentage of migrants remitting is smaller in cohort 2 upon 
arrival with 4.2% remitting compared to 7.8% in cohort 1. The statistics and estimations 
using the values of remittances are deflated and expressed in year 2000 AUD. It appears that 
the average remittances are also larger in cohort 1 upon arrival. By the second wave of 
interview, the difference between the two cohorts is no longer significant, with average 
remittances of about A$350. 
Table 6 reports average remittances according to the time spent in Australia. Since there 
is no third wave of interview in cohort 2, we only have 17 observations for which the 
migrants have been in Australia for more than 24 months. The average remittance figure of 
A$30 for these observations is therefore not informative. Table 6 gives qualitatively similar 
information than the previous one: cohort 1 migrants remit more on average upon arrival but 
cohort 2 migrants catch up within 12 months. We also observe more variability in the 
remittance levels for first cohort migrants. The average percentages and amounts given in 
these tables hide important discrepancies across countries of origin. For instance, the 
percentage of individuals remitting to Southern Europe decreases by 73% between cohort 1 
and 2 and by 68% and 63% for migrants from the Middle East and North East Asia 
respectively. Migrants from Eastern Europe and South America or Africa experience only 
half of such a fall in the percentage remitting (Table 7). Looking across waves, it appears that 
the percentage of migrants from Southern and Eastern Europe, South Asia and Middle East 
who remit increases faster in cohort 1 compared to those from other regions. In cohort 2, we 
observe the highest increases for individuals from the Middle East, South America or Africa, 
Southern Europe and South East Asia and the increase across waves is more modest. The 
multivariate estimations will enable us to see whether such large discrepancies remain among 
regions of origin once we control for individual characteristics, notably in terms of labour 
market outcome and family structure. Finally, Table 8 shows that, compared to cohort 1, the 





4. Empirical Methodology 
The aim of the estimations is twofold. First, we highlight the factors determining both 
the probability and the level of remittances by the newly arrived migrants surveyed in the 
LSIA. Second, we investigate to what extent the change in immigration policies (tightening 
of the point system and restriction in welfare payments) affected this remittance behaviour. 
Since the policy change had two opposing effects – negatively affecting some migrants’ 
disposable income by restricting access to welfare payments while positively affecting the 
selection of more employable individuals with higher earning capacities (Mahuteau & 
Junankar, 2008) – the overall effect on immigrants’ remittance behaviour is ex ante not clear. 
On the one hand, restrictions imposed in the new regime could possibly cause higher 
financial pressure and/or uncertainty which may have increased the incentives to remit, 
perhaps for insurance purposes, in case of a failure in the migration experience. On the other 
hand, however tightening of migrants’ selection suggests that they are more likely to be better 
qualified and hence have a higher probability to find a job, resulting in a lower demand for 
insurance. At the same time, remittances are not solely motivated by the insurance motive but 
also by altruistic concerns for relatives and friends left behind. It is likely that the latter 
motive is positively correlated with migrants’ level of remittances. With the exception of 
more immigrants from Africa, there are not marked differences in the geographic 
composition of immigrants between the two cohorts. 
Looking at individuals’ remittance behaviour is very much like investigating 
households’ durable good consumption in the sense that, in the survey period, one encounters 
a large proportion of observations with zeros. Remittances equal to zero for a given 
observation can be given two interpretations. On the one hand, it can be a behavioural zero, 
that is, the individual actually decided not to send money back. It represents a conscious 
choice arising from the comparison between the utility of sending versus not sending 
remittances. On the other hand, it can be a random zero or potential positive (Moffat, 2005) 
where the migrant would have a preference for remitting but, for some reason related to 
personal circumstances at the time of the survey (ability to pay, etc) has not been able to do 
so. Therefore the distribution of remittances in our sample is censored. This situation is 
commonly observed in studies of labour supply (Blundell & Meghir, 1986), durable good 
consumption models, loan default analysis (Moffat, 2005) or valuation of wildlife 
conservation (Shrestha et. al. 2006). The estimation technique used hinges on the treatment 
we choose to give to the zero observations and whether we take into account the behavioural 
zeros explicitly.  10 
 
The common way of dealing with censored dependent variables is to estimate a Tobit 
model including all observations of the dependent variable, including the zeros, and 
correcting for censoring. The drawback of this method is that one considers the decision to 
participate and the level of participation as stemming from the same probability mechanism; 
the same determinants affect the probability to remit and the level of remittances. This 
specification may be adapted in some circumstances where it is reasonable to consider the 
zero values as corner solutions. However, in the case of migrants’ remitting behaviour, 
economic theory suggests that some determinants may affect the probability to remit in one 
direction but the expected level of remittances in the opposite direction. This distinction is 
important in this paper since we are interested in the effect of migration policy changes on 
immigrants overall behaviour to remit.  
Extensions of the Tobit model imply two equations (estimated simultaneously or not). 
The advantage of these models is that common regressors of both equations may affect the 
participation decision differently than the level of remittances. Moreover, they allow us to 
condition the participation decision on a different set of regressors than that used to explain 
the amount remitted by individuals. Several alternatives are available depending on whether 
we treat all zeros as stemming from an individual’s decision not to participate (two-part 
model, Generalized Tobit and Heckman two-step selection model) or interpret part of the 
non-remittances as coming from some random event that prevented the migrant from 
remitting despite being willing to do so (double hurdle model with and without dependence). 
In some studies whose focus is on the usage of a particular good (cigarettes, internet, etc) or 
on labour supply, the two decisions are usually clearly separated. One question records 
ownership of the good, e.g., whether individuals are smokers or whether they participate in 
the labour force while the second question delimits a survey period for which individuals are 
asked about their level of consumption, number of hours worked as well as other relevant 
information. In such studies one is likely to encounter individuals who answer the first 
question in the affirmative but who record no consumption of the good at all during the 
survey period or no hours worked, hence two types of zeros appear in the data. Double hurdle 
models are designed specifically to deal with these two types of zeros explicitly in the 
likelihood function while two-part models, Generalized Tobit and two-step selection models 
assume that once the first hurdle is overcome (participation) one should not observe any 
zeros. In this paper, the occurrence and level of remittances variables are constructed from 
the same question. Therefore we only observe one type of zeros; that of non-participation. 
Remittance behaviour is described as follows:      11 
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where the first equation represents the participation decision (first hurdle), that is whether the 
migrant decides to remit or not. 
*
i d  is a latent variable representing the difference in utility 
between remitting and not remitting which is not observable. The observable counterpart of 
this latent variable consists in the actual observation of whether the migrant sent some money 
or not.  i z  is a vector of migrants’ characteristics expected to affect the decision to remit such 
as education, current socio-economic situation. 
*
i y  is also a latent variable whose observable 
counterpart is the max between 0 and the level of remittances;  i x  is a vector of 
characteristics, which may include exactly the same regressors as those included in  i z  or not 
(the model is specified either way). 
In the generalized Tobit (Heckman, 1978), we assume that the unobservables in both 
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However, Heckman (1979) shows that a two-step estimation of the model is more 
robust since it doesn’t rely on a bivariate normal distribution of the unobservables, which, in 
the case of remittance observations is unlikely. In a Monte Carlo study, Flood and Gråsjö 
(2001) show the extent of the bias implied by maximum likelihood estimation of this 
selection Tobit. 
The two step estimation of the model implies estimating the first hurdle by Probit 
from which one calculates the Mills ratio ( ( ) ( )
''
11 / ii zz φ ββ Φ ) to be used as a regressor in the 12 
 
second equation estimated by OLS. The idea is that migrants who choose to remit are a self-
selected group and hence estimations of the level of remittances need to be corrected for the 
selection bias they contain. Therefore, the two step model leads to the following conditional 




































is the Inverse Mills’ ratio correcting for selection. It is computed 
from the results obtained in the Probit which models individuals’ participation. The 
unconditional expectation of the amount of remittance is then given by: 
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This method has been under some criticism in the literature (e.g., Manning et al., 1987; Hay 
et al., 1987) and has been compared it to the two-part model, which here implies that the 
decision to remit would be independent from the choice of remittance levels itself. The critics 
argue that the inclusion of the Mills’ ratio in the second equation would cause severe 
collinearity issues with the model, especially if the vectors z and x contain the exact same 
variables. Indeed, it is sufficient that the first step of the estimation be non-linear (Probit) to 
be able to identify the parameters in both equations when the two vectors contain the same 
variables. Using Monte Carlo studies the critics argue that even when the true model is the 
two-step, the two-part model would perform best among the two. However, Leung and Yu 
(2000) resolve this controversy by providing further Monte Carlo studies highlighting the 
merits of the two-step method but also emphasizing the issue of collinearity in this type of 
model. They show that one can use a t-test to choose among the two models so long as there 
is no collinearity issue in the two-step. In order to avoid collinearity issues, we imposed a 
number of exclusion restrictions in our Heckman selection model. We estimate both types of 
model and let the t-test decide which should be preferred. 
The two-part model simply consists in estimating the participation equation by Probit 
separately, namely estimating the probability that individuals remit positive amounts, and the 
amount of remittances by OLS on the subsample of observations for which the remittances 
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Because of the way we constructed the participation variable, namely by attributing a zero 
whenever the level of remittance is zero and a 1 when it is greater than zero, double hurdle 
models would not improve our estimations in any way since one does not observe 
simultaneously participation and zero remittances. Double hurdle models will enable us to 
decompose the contribution to the likelihood of zero remittance observations between the 
behavioural  zeros (non-participation) and the random  zeros (participation but no 
remittances). To illustrate this, we can write the likelihood function for the double hurdle 
model with independence
6 whose structure is given by: 
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One can see that the only difference between this likelihood function and that given 
for the selection model is the inclusion of  ( )
'
2 i x β σ Φ which takes care of cases where d=1 
but y=0. Since we don’t have any observation corresponding to this situation, the double 
hurdle model would be equivalent to our selection model. Therefore it is not necessary to 
estimate double hurdle models for this analysis. 
Altogether, we estimate four types of models: the basic Tobit, two-part model, model 
with selection estimated by Maximum likelihood and the Heckman two step model.  It is to 
be noted that some of these models depend on the assumption of normality and 
homoskedasticity of the errors. If these assumptions fail, the estimated parameters are shown 
                                                            
6 The same is true for the model with dependence. We choose the Cragg’s specification for ease of presentation 
but the conclusion can be generalized to dependent hurdle models (Jones, 1992). 14 
 
to be inconsistent (Robinson, 1982). Therefore, we correct for multiplicative 
heteroskedasticity, specifying  ( )
' exp ii w σ δ = , with wi a set of variables assumed to cause 
heteroskedasticity. Moreover, because the migrants are interviewed several times in both 
cohorts (three times in cohort 1 and twice in the second cohort) we corrected the standard 
errors for clustering since the estimations didn’t lend themselves to panel estimations due to 
limitations of the dataset and the instability they caused to the estimators.  Correction for 
clustering enables us to take into account multiple observations for an individual but does not 
allow to model individual heterogeneity.  
As regards the normality assumption, the literature proposes to transform the 
dependent variable whenever it is censored and over dispersed, which is the case for the 
observed remittances in our data. Indeed, remittances range from A$10 to A$50,000 in cohort 
1 and from A$11 to A$46,600 in cohort 2, with a large mass point in 0 since it is censored. 
Given such over dispersion, the transformation is necessary in order to reduce the influence 
of extreme observations. Burbidge et al. (1988) show that the inverse hyperbolic sine 
transformation is superior to a Box-Cox transformation in handling extreme values. We 
therefore apply this transformation to the remittances. The inverse hyperbolic sine 
transformation is defined as: ( )
22 ln 1
T
i yy y γ γ =+ +, with γ as an extra parameter to be 
estimated. The likelihood functions are modified accordingly. 
The comparison between remittance behaviour before and after the policy change is 
captured in the estimations through the incorporation of a dichotomic variable taking value 1 
if the migrant arrived after the policy change. In addition, we interact this dummy with a 
number of variables assumed to determine the level of remittances. This enables us to obtain 
difference in difference estimators for these variables. The estimated parameter indicates to 
what extent the influence of these variables has changed, if at all, after the new policy. More 
specifically, we wonder whether the policy change affected the remittance behaviour 
differently depending on the region of birth, the labour force status or the visa type
7. With 
respect to the  visa type, we know that migrants arriving under humanitarian visas (refugees) 
do not have to wait the 2 years period to be eligible for welfare payments, contrary to most 
other visa categories under the new policy. By interacting cohort and refugee visa we can 
determine the difference in terms of occurrence and level of remittances between two 
refugees, one arriving with the first cohort, the second after the policy change. It is also 
                                                            
7  Identification and convergence issues prevent us from interacting cohort with all the regressors of each 
equation. 15 
 
interesting to look at the effect of the migrant’s region of origin on both decisions 
(probability and level of remittances) since the policy change may have a bigger impact on  
migrants coming from developing regions (e.g. South Asia etc) than those from the 
developed one (e.g., USA, Western Europe etc).. If significant differences are observed for 
various regions, it implies that the policy change in Australia also has repercussions for the 
sending regions. The descriptive statistics seemed to indicate discrepancies among regions of 
origin. The estimations will enable us to conclude whether these discrepancies remain after 
controlling for a range of individual characteristics.  
In the estimations, we also control for individuals’ labour force status and family 
arrangements in order to make individuals comparable between cohorts since each cohort 
faced slightly different labour market conditions upon arrival. Tougher selection criteria can 
also imply potentially higher levels of labour force participation. We interact the labour force 
status variables with the cohort dummy to see if two migrants with the same labour force 
status and comparable in terms of individual characteristics, but arriving under different 
policy regime, exhibit different remittance behaviours. 
 
 
5. Estimation Results 
Tables 9 and 10 report the estimation results. Table 9 includes the results from a basic 
Tobit and a model with selection estimated by maximum likelihood. Table 10 reports the 
results of the two-part model and two-step selection. Based on Information criteria, Vuong 
and Distribution Free test, it appears that the two-part model and two-step selection give 
better estimates than the other two used in Table 9. Among those used in Table 10, the two-
step selection gives slightly better estimates than the two-part model, though overall the 
results are rather similar. Therefore, in the following, we exploit the results from the former 
model (Table 10), including the discussion on the probability to remit.  
It is interesting to notice the benefits from assuming that the decision to remit and the 
amounts of remittances are generated by different probability mechanisms. Indeed, the Tobit 
gives misleading results concerning the influence of the variables on the censored remittance 
levels since the better models not only show that the levels are determined by different 
variables but also that some variables affect participation and levels in opposite directions. 
Therefore, it makes sense to estimate a two equations model. In order to reduce the potential 
issue of collinearity between the Mills’ ratio and the variables included in the second 16 
 
equation, we imposed some exclusion restrictions in the estimations of the probability to 
remit. 
 
5.1 The Decision to Remit 
It appears that the residual effect of cohort is negative. Migrants arriving after the 
policy change have a lower probability to remit (about 8.6%) than those who entered before 
the change (cohort 1). Given that we control for a wide range of individual characteristics, 
including education levels, labour force status, region of origin , and other covariates, this  
result partly captures elements related to the selection of better migrants (aside from 
characteristics that are controlled for) and better macroeconomic environment experienced by 
second cohort migrants in Australia. Both elements meant that it was relatively easier to 
obtain gainful employment for those who entered after the policy change. Given our earlier 
discussion about immigrants remitting behaviour corresponding to a purchase of insurance in 
case of bad economic outcome, this result will then be consistent with a reduced need for 
buying that insurance and hence reducing the possibility of remittance flows in the initial 
stage of immigration episode. However, as argued by Stark (1991), contrary to some existing 
evidence, there is a potential for an increase in remittance flows as time spent in the host 
country increases. As remittances are part of migrant’s implicit family insurance 
arrangement, in the case of successful migration experience, the migrant insures the family 
left behind against more risky investment activities. Our results are in line with this argument. 
Figure 3 illustrates the observation that first cohort migrants are systematically more likely to 
remit since arrival and throughout their stay in Australia.
8 
Individuals migrating under refugee protection visas have, on average, a higher 
probability (6.5%) than non-refugees but this difference is halved in cohort 2. It is an 
interesting result since the policy change didn’t have any discernable effect on those entering 
under refugee status as they are not subjected to the two years waiting period before 
eligibility to welfare payments. This result is not due to refugees being sourced from a 
different part of the world in cohort 2 compared to cohort 1 since we control for region of 
origin. It is unlikely that refugees remit because they feel the need to buy an insurance policy 
to hedge the risk associated with migrating. Rather, most refugees would send money back to 
help family members left behind in difficult situations. Therefore, if they do remit less after 
the policy change, it is likely caused by financial hardship in Australia despite their eligibility 
                                                            
8 Markova and Reilly (2007) get the same result for Bulgarian immigrants who legally entered Spain prior to 
Bulgaria’s accession to the EU.  17 
 
to welfare payments. Since the selection criteria for migration have changed and have led to 
the arrival of more skilled and employable migrants, refugees arriving with the second cohort 
may have faced fiercer competition in the labour market in Australia which may have 
reduced their ability to send remittances. They might also have chosen to live in different 
types of neighbourhood relative to those of the first cohort, though we do not have sufficient 
information to control for this possibility. 
As regards the region of origin, there are noticeable differences in the probabilities to 
remit between migrants coming from Western (developed) regions and those coming from 
non-Western (less developed) regions. For instance, migrants from South Asia are 20% more 
likely to remit than Westerners while people coming from North East Asia and Eastern 
Europe have 6.8% and 8% higher probabilities to remit respectively. The cohort effect 
significantly decreases the probabilities for some regions, i.e., Southern Europe, the Middle 
East and all of Asia, though non-Westerners still have a higher probability to remit. The 
biggest decrease in cohort 2 is observed for Southern Europe with a net positive effect of 
2.5% compared to Westerners in cohort 2, falling from 10.5% in cohort 1 (a decrease of 8 
points between the two cohorts). We observe the same effect for Middle Eastern migrants. On 
the opposite, migrants coming from Eastern Europe do not have a significantly lower 
probability to remit after the policy change. It seems that the biggest drops are observed for 
migrants who come from countries associated to earlier waves of migration. Individuals 
coming from countries with a longer history of migration to Australia may benefit, to a larger 
extent, from social ethnic networks and may have more family members and friends already 
present in Australia which reduces their need to send money abroad. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate 
with more details the differences between countries for the two cohorts regarding 
probabilities to remit. The profiles of the probabilities per country according to the time spent 
in Australia are distinctly different between the two cohorts. After the policy change the 
profiles of the probabilities are not only flatter but they also illustrate some significant 
changes in the ordering of the countries. 
Migrants’ labour force status affects their probability to remit. Self-employed (or 
running a business employing others) and wage earners are more likely to remit than 
individuals who are not in the labour force (including students). On the contrary, unemployed 
individuals are less likely to remit. Interestingly, cohort 2 migrants are not different from the 
first cohort as regards the influence of the labour force status on the probabilities to remit; 
wage earners remain about 8.7% more likely to remit as well as business owners who have a 
3.3% higher probability. 18 
 
As regards the highest level of education attained, it is interesting to notice that most 
coefficients are not significant except for individuals who only completed primary or 
secondary school. These are more likely to remit than someone with a university degree. 
Adding interaction terms between cohort and education levels lead to the same results
9, 
indicating that no significant change occurs as regards the effect of education on the 
probability to remit after the policy change. This result shows that education by itself does 
not have an impact on the remittance behaviour but rather on the labour market performance. 
Language ability also affects the probabilities. Migrants reporting that they speak English 
very well (or well) are more likely to remit. 
Individuals who visited Australia before deciding to migrate and who have been 
shown to experience better labour market outcomes (Mahuteau and Junankar, 2008) are 5% 
less likely to remit. These are probably individuals with greater financial means who could 
afford spending some time in Australia before migrating. Along the same lines, the more 
funds individuals brought with them to Australia, the less likely they are to remit.  
The household size negatively affects the probability to remit. This is commonly 
observed in the literature for other countries (Sinning, 2007). Married individuals are more 
likely to remit. This is consistent with results obtained in the literature on remittance 
behaviour. 
Overall the main difference between the two cohorts as regards the probability to 
remit is a  negative residual cohort effect of -8.65%. The labour force status does not affect 
the probability to remit.  
  
5.2 The value of remittances 
It is clear from Table 10 that some determinants affect the probability to remit in one 
way but the level of remittances in the opposite direction, especially in the case of cohort 2 
The migrants in the second cohort are less likely to remit but, when they do, they remit higher 
amount than those in the first cohort.  
The results show that the variables assumed to affect individuals’ remittance 
behaviour influence the probabilities to remit to a larger extent than the actual level of 
remittances. Although the regional effect was important in determining the probabilities, it 
hardly plays any role on the expected level of remittances. The results of a nested test 
                                                            
9 Results not reported in this paper but available on request 19 
 
between the displayed model and the one model restricting the regions of origin parameters to 
be zero leads to reject the latter model.  
The ability to pay is expected to affect the remittance levels to a larger extent than the 
probabilities to remit. Looking at the results obtained for the income categories, perhaps not 
surprisingly, individuals with higher average income remit more than people with 
intermediate income, while individuals belonging in the lower income bracket (A$155 to 
A$385 a week) remit significantly less. As migrants are interviewed fairly early after arrival, 
it is possible that they are still in the early process of settlement and face a greater uncertainty 
about their future income. The omitted category of income corresponds for both cohort 1 and 
2 migrants to the median weekly income in Australia (sourced from the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (ABS). The result shows that so long as migrants are below this threshold, their 
remittances are significantly lower.     
Business owners and self employed individuals are not only more likely to remit but 
also remit more than wage earners. Using German Socio-economic Panel data, Dustmann 
(1999) showed that business owners in the host country are more likely to return to their 
home country before retirement and run a business upon return. This may explain why they 
remit more to their home country, contrasting with those who plan to stay permanently in the 
host country or move back after retirement. Wage earners are more likely to invest in human 
capital in the host country and therefore stay longer in order to make their investment more 
profitable. Those returning as retirees tend to accumulate their savings in the country that 
offers higher returns (or security), hence a smaller part of their savings is sent back abroad. 
Yet, it appears that second cohort migrants who run a business remit less than those in the 
first cohort. Given that second cohort migrants faced better macroeconomic conditions in 
Australia, it is less likely that they didn’t have the ability to remit a higher amount. Thus the 
alternative reason on why remittances should have dropped for these individuals is possibly 
more to do with them facing less uncertainty about the economic survival of their business 
venture, compared to the business owners in the first cohort. This then corresponds to the 
often discussed argument in the literature of migrants’ remittance decision as part of the 
insurance motive to hedge against a possible failure of the migration experience. In other 
words, the insurance motive for the second cohort was considerably lower than for the first 
cohort.  
Household size has a negative impact on the probability and the level of remittances, 
which is consistent with the existing literature (see Sinning, 2007). The effect of being 
married on remittances is not as straightforward since it has a positive effect on the 20 
 
probability but a negative influence on the level. Since we control for household size in the 
estimations, the lower level of remittances observed for married couples is not immediately 
due to having dependents to take care of in Australia. This effect can be due to having larger 
expenses like dwellings and food, among others. As for the larger probability, it can be that 
as a household, married migrants combine more relatives left in the origin country and 
consequently more individuals likely to be needing assistance via remittances. 
Time spent in Australia positively affects both the level of remittances and the 
probability to remit. It is important to notice that this effect is controlled for the individuals’ 
labour force status and income. This residual effect of time can be attributed, as the literature 
suggests to two associated factors. First, as time passes the fixed costs of settlement (e.g. 
furniture, car, etc.) decrease, improving migrants’ ability to remit. Second, family and friends 
who stayed behind perhaps contributed a significant proportion of the migration costs. 
Therefore, as their ability to pay improves, this category of migrants remits more for the 
purpose of reimbursement of the financial contributions they benefited from.  Unfortunately, 
the data does not allow us to check this as no useful information is available regarding how 
much financial help migrants received from family and friends. The interaction of time spent 
in Australia and cohort is positive but only significant with a p-value of 15%. This effect is 
weak suggesting that there is not significantly different impact of time across cohorts.   
Summarising the  effect of being a cohort 2 migrant on the conditional expectation of 
remittances ( ()
* ,0 iii Eyxy> , after the policy change the probabilities to remit have been 
affected to a larger extent than the actual level of remittances for most individual 
characteristics.  Table 11 shows the difference-in-difference estimators and cohort effects 
obtained for the conditional expectations. If a migrant remits, s/he tends to send more money 
after the policy change. The cohort effect influences the conditional expectation similarly 
across regions of origin and labour force status with a noticeable exception for the business 
owners who remit significantly less. 
Tables 12, 13 and 14 give some estimates of the unconditional expectations of 
remittances across cohort for different visa categories, regions of origin and labour force 
status. They are given by: 
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Everything else held constant, upon arrival in cohort 1 a refugee is expected to remit 
an average of A$180 and then increase the transfers to A$641 in wave 2 and A$1305 in the 21 
 
last wave. By comparison, a refugee from the second cohort remits A$70 upon arrival and 
then moves on to A$342 in the last wave. The average unconditional expectations show some 
variability across countries, both in terms of level and variation across waves. Migrants from 
the UK, Western Europe and Oceania start in the first cohort with remittances below $100 on 
average, against South Asians at A$337. Even though the former group increases their 
remittances faster over time, by wave 3 migrants from South Asia still remain the highest 
remitters with A$1851 on average. Migrants from the Middle East and Asia in general remit 
above A$1200 by the third wave. Qualitatively, we find similar patterns in the second cohort 
except that the level of remittances is on average higher upon arrival compared to cohort 1, 
except for people originating from South Europe, the Middle East, North America and South 
Asia but most differences are not significant. By the time of wave 2 of cohort 2, migrants 
from South Asia are again the largest remitters with A$1118, followed by Eastern Europe 
with A$840. As regards the labour force status (Table 13), wage earners and business owners 
are remitting more in the first cohort with A$405 and A$208 respectively. By wave 3, that is 
beyond 24 months after arrival, business owners remit A$1338 on average and wage earners 
A$1936. As we have seen in the estimations above, business owner in cohort 2 remit 
significantly less. It is illustrated in Table 13 by average remittances of A$54 in the first 
wave, increasing only up to A$242. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Several aspects could influence the remittance flows from migrants to their families 
and friends in the sending countries. These range from repaying of loans to fund migration 
costs, altruism towards those who remain in the country of origin or indeed because of selfish 
reasons to curry favour with those remaining back home in case the migration experiment 
ends up in a failure (i.e., equivalent to taking insurance against bad economic outcome). 
These are also linked to migrants’ skill level as relatively more educated are likely to secure 
stable employment and also more likely to move with their families compared to the low 
skilled. In this case there are potential benefits to the host country as skilled immigrants  have 
a positive impact not only in terms of overcoming labour market shortages in high skill 
industries but also in terms of better economic assimilation resulting in higher investment and 
tax receipts in the host country. However, education can also have a positive effect on 
remittance flows as migration decision might be linked to obtain some target saving to start 
business in the home country, especially in the presence of credit constraints, which could 
indeed benefit the home country, possibly at the expense of the host country. 22 
 
We have analysed the impact of a change in immigration policy on the remittance 
behaviour of immigrants in Australia. The new policy, which was implemented after 1996, 
dramatically changed the conditions of entry making them more stringent both in terms of 
initial requirements (relatively higher skills and English language proficiency) and in terms of 
curbing the level of support offered upon entry.  The analysis is done using two sets of the 
Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants in Australia. Our results point towards the direction of an 
overall negative relationship between stringent entry policy and the incidence of remittance 
flows. Those who entered in the second cohort, regardless of the origin region or type of job 
obtained, had a lower probability to remit compared to the first cohort. However, of those 
who did remit in the second cohort, the average level was higher than those who entered in 
the first cohort. In addition, not surprisingly both wage earners and self-employed are more 
likely to remit than unemployed. Finally, self-employed remit a higher amount than the wage 
earners. 
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Table 1: Migrants by visa categories 
Major Visa Category  LSIA 1  LSIA2 
Business (%)  3.44  5.79 
Family (%)  65.33  62.18 
Humanitarian (%)  14.12  7.44 
Independent (%)  17.12  24.59 
 
Table 2: Composition of immigrant population for cohort 1 (1993-1995) cohort 2 (1998-2000); by 
region of birth 
 
Migrant population 
arrived with cohort 1 
Migrant population 
arrived with cohort 1 
Region of Birth  Freq.  Percent  Freq.  Percent 
Oceania 1,858  2.48  959  2.96 
Great Britain  11,454  15.27  4,752  14.66 
South Europe  6,530  8.71  2,293  7.07 
Western Europe  2,918  3.89  1,187  3.66 
Eastern Europe  3,505  4.67  993  3.06 
Middle East  7,383  9.84  3,356  10.35 
South East Asia  16,305  21.74  5,879  18.14 
North East Asia  10,245  13.66  5,259  16.23 
South Asia  7,208  9.61  3,437  10.6 
North America  2,685  3.58  1,112  3.43 
Central, South America 1,335  1.78  423  1.3 
Africa 3,563  4.75  2,764  8.53 
Total 74,990  100  32,415  100 
 
Table 3: Highest level of education completed by arrival cohort (percent of the immigrant population) 
 












Primary  school  4.98 4.93 4.68 3.67 3.95 
Secondary  school  33.22 33.72 28.67 25.56 26.08 
Trade 7.28  7.16  8.12  6.7  6.97 
technical/professional  21.55 21.46 22.48 20.64 20.69 
Undergraduate  Degree  20.98  20.8  20.11 23.84 21.82 
Post graduate degree  4.95  4.88  6.27  5.44  6.76 
Higher degree  7.04  7.05  9.66  14.16  13.73 









Table 4: Labour Force Status in Australia by wave of interview and cohort (population) 
  Cohort1 Cohort2 
   wave 1  wave 2  wave 3  wave 1  wave 2 
Business Owner (employing 
others, self employed)  2.97%  4.93%  6.40%  5.05%  8.42% 
Business owner, self 
employed  2.28%  3.54%  4.55%  3.69%  6.41% 
Business owner employing 
others  0.68%  1.38%  1.86%  1.36%  2.02% 
Wage earner  31.83%  42.84%  48.44%  45.80%  53.55% 
Other employed  0.48%  0.84%  0.13%  0.29%  0.26% 
Unemployed looking for full time 
or part time job  22.63%  13.94%  10.33%  11.18%  7.20% 
Unemployed looking for 
full time job  20.43%  12.22%  8.39%  9.28%  5.53% 
Unemployed looking for 
part time job  2.20%  1.72%  1.94%  1.89%  1.66% 
Student  16.21%  13.57%  6.74%  15.15%  8.09% 
Not in the labour force  25.87%  23.88%  27.95%  22.53%  22.48% 
 
 
Table 5: Percent of migrant population remitting by interview wave (population) 
 
 
Table 6: Amount of remittances sent abroad by time since arrival, AUD 2000 (population) 
Remittances ($)  Observations  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Cohort 1      
6 mths or less  4379 85.88  566.86 
6 to 12 mths  794 146.89  755.74 
12 to 18 mths  3491 350.12  1727.31 
18 to 24 mths  980 337.45  1154.01 
24 mths or more  3757 766.81  2583.35 
Cohort 2      
6 mths or less  2329 69.62  472.09 
6 to 12 mths  794 93.76  497.28 
12 to 18 mths  1713 367.88  1612.56 
18 to 24 mths  917 336.09  1145.83 
24 mths or more  17 30.86  167.24 
 
  Percent remitting  
(population) 
Average value of 
remittances in AUD 
(population)
cohort 1 wave 1  7.76%  93.11 
cohort 1 wave 2  22.00%  348.28 
cohort 1 wave 3  31.05%  770.71 
cohort 2 wave 1  4.20%  76.08 
cohort 2 wave 2  13.40%  355.26 28 
 
Table 7: Percent of migrants remitting by country of origin (population) 
   Cohort 1  Cohort 2 
   all  waves wave1 wave2 wave3  all  waves wave1 wave2 
Western Industrialized 
Country  7.92%  6.79% 8.43% 8.55% 3.52%  2.23% 4.80% 
South America, Africa  15.72% 8.93% 17.11% 21.13% 9.58%  3.59% 15.57% 
South Europe  17.04% 6.50% 19.73% 24.89% 4.56%  2.16% 6.95% 
Eastern Europe  13.94% 3.92% 15.25% 22.66% 9.18%  5.61% 12.76% 
Middle East  16.54% 6.98% 18.76% 23.88% 5.23%  1.31% 9.15% 
South East Asia  21.84% 10.75% 23.61% 31.15% 10.65% 5.48% 15.82% 
North East Asia  10.83% 4.98% 12.24% 15.26% 3.90%  2.46% 5.34% 
South Asia  25.51% 10.25% 28.93% 37.36% 10.31% 5.67% 14.95% 
 
Table 8: Amount of remittances sent abroad by country of origin, AUD 2000 (population) 
   Cohort 1  Cohort 2 
   all  waves wave1 wave2 wave3  all  waves wave1 wave2 
Western Industrialized 
Country  274.97  133.29 294.29 454.71 138.45  44.33 252.57 
South America, Africa  319.31  81.47 278.79  700.00  259.98  80.87 466.97 
South Europe  290.86  51.37 230.56  693.24  100.52  36.13 174.09 
Eastern Europe  259.00  26.78 169.08  660.72  183.86  80.55 305.11 
Middle East  354.49  55.97 284.56  852.03 79.16  13.18 156.51 
South East Asia  442.84  112.41 408.00 932.92 260.68  92.29 459.29 
North East Asia  500.91  107.27 433.60  1205.04 133.04  51.11 233.78 




Table 9: Estimation results, Tobit and Selection model (MLE) 
 Tobit Selection  model 








Cohort -6.188**  -0.645***  -0.0764  -0.0146  0.389  0.386 
 (2.590)  (0.227)  (0.175)  (0.0328) (0.286) (0.284) 
Country of origin:  
(reference: Western Industrialized country)     
South America or Africa  5.100***  0.884***  0.509***  0.124***  0.813***  0.809*** 
 (1.125)  (0.255)  (0.0815)  (0.0237) (0.161) (0.161) 
South Europe  4.375***  0.714***  0.436***  0.102***  0.778***  0.774*** 
 (1.118)  (0.228)  (0.0839)  (0.0228) (0.166) (0.165) 
Eastern Europe  3.462***  0.541**  0.303***  0.0679***  0.450***  0.447*** 
 (1.133)  (0.214)  (0.0830)  (0.0210) (0.164) (0.163) 
Middle East  4.225***  0.674*** 0.457*** 0.107*** 0.818***  0.813***
 (1.105)  (0.217)  (0.0801)  (0.0218) (0.158) (0.157) 
South East Asia  6.824***  1.226***  0.684***  0.169***  1.230***  1.224*** 
 (1.076)  (0.260)  (0.0769)  (0.0228) (0.154) (0.153) 
North East Asia  3.243***  0.484**  0.367***  0.0823***  0.740***  0.736*** 
 (1.119)  (0.195)  (0.0790)  (0.0200) (0.156) (0.156) 
South Asia  7.180***  1.465***  0.746***  0.202***  1.339***  1.333*** 
 (1.116)  (0.329)  (0.0838)  (0.0285) (0.166) (0.165) 
Interaction country*cohort:          
Cohort* South America or 
Africa  -1.291 -0.147  -0.147  -0.0264 -0.209  -0.207 
 (1.999)  (0.205)  (0.167)  (0.0273) (0.334) (0.330) 
Cohort*South Europe  -5.499***  -0.467***  -0.557***  -0.0794***  -1.026***  -1.009*** 
 (2.103)  (0.111)  (0.170)  (0.0164) (0.341) (0.331) 
Cohort*Eastern Europe  -0.268  -0.0330  -0.0179  -0.00347  0.0973  0.0966 
 (2.105)  (0.254) (0.169) (0.0324) (0.337) (0.334)
Cohort*Middle East  -3.473*  -0.337**  -0.388**  -0.0605***  -0.805**  -0.793** 
 (2.047)  (0.148)  (0.173)  (0.0208) (0.347) (0.339) 
Cohort*South East Asia  -2.369  -0.250  -0.321**  -0.0524***  -0.563*  -0.556* 
 (1.847)  (0.162)  (0.147)  (0.0197) (0.294) (0.289) 
Cohort*North East Asia  -2.779  -0.287*  -0.351** -0.0566***  -0.494  -0.489 
 (1.988)  (0.165)  (0.157)  (0.0203) (0.321) (0.316) 
Cohort*South Asia  -4.474**  -0.395***  -0.529***  -0.0744***  -0.866**  -0.853** 
 (2.167)  (0.126)  (0.194)  (0.0180) (0.384) (0.374) 
Labour Force Status in Australia (reference: not in labour force     
Business owner or self 
employed  1.384 0.192 0.206*** 0.0448** 0.563***  0.560*** 
 (0.852)  (0.130)  (0.0771)  (0.0185) (0.152) (0.151) 
Wage earner  3.444***  0.477***  0.470***  0.101***  0.877***  0.870*** 
 (0.511)  (0.0792)  (0.0381)  (0.00894)  (0.0805)  (0.0795) 
Unemployed -1.264**  -0.148***  -0.133***  -0.0246***  -0.180*  -0.179* 
 (0.501)  (0.0546)  (0.0476)  (0.00833)  (0.0931)  (0.0922) 
Cohort*Business -0.354  -0.0433  0.139  0.0295  -3.060***  -2.837*** 
 (2.168)  (0.257) (0.178) (0.0405) (0.424) (0.330)
Cohort*Wage earner  2.013**  0.288**  0.0880  0.0179  0.0992  0.0984 
 (0.905)  (0.146)  (0.0822)  (0.0174) (0.162) (0.161) 
Cohort*Unemployed 1.242  0.171  0.119 0.0250  0.287 0.285 
 (1.504)  (0.227)  (0.143)  (0.0317) (0.287) (0.286) 
Household size  -0.333***  -0.0418***  -0.0376***  -0.00734***  -0.0672***  -0.0666*** 
 (0.0956)  (0.0120)  (0.00847)  (0.00165)  (0.0165)  (0.0163) 
Age at migration  0.148*  0.0186* 0.0146*** 0.00285***    
 (0.0873)  (0.0110)  (0.00385)  (0.000754)     
Age at migration sq  -0.00319*** -0.000400*** -0.000207***  -4.05e-05***     
 (0.00106)  (0.000133)  (4.82e-05) (9.44e-06)     
Visited Australia prior to 
migration  -2.680*** -0.316***  -0.296***  -0.0548***  -0.463***  -0.458*** 
 (0.421)  (0.0472)  (0.0353)  (0.00618)  (0.0709)  (0.0699) 
Female -0.346  -0.0434  -0.0269  -0.00524  -0.0220  -0.0218 
 (0.345)  (0.0431) (0.0302) (0.00589) (0.0592)  (0.0587)30 
 
English language ability: (reference: Does not speak well)     
Speak very well  2.097***  0.292***  0.239***  0.0509***  0.397***  0.395*** 
 (0.497)  (0.0770)  (0.0432)  (0.00996)  (0.0829)  (0.0823) 
Speak well  1.498***  0.194***  0.167***  0.0335***  0.279***  0.277*** 
 (0.375)  (0.0508)  (0.0340)  (0.00700)  (0.0652)  (0.0647) 
Does not speak at all  -0.321  -0.0395  -0.0545  -0.0104  -0.155  -0.153 
 (0.670)  (0.0806)  (0.0628) (0.0116)  (0.123) (0.122) 
Married 1.190***  0.144***  0.0878***  0.0168***  0.0230  0.0228 
 (0.375)  (0.0435)  (0.0313)  (0.00586)  (0.0617)  (0.0612) 
Nb days since migrated  0.0224***  0.00281*** 0.00201***  0.000393***  0.00404***  0.00401*** 
 (0.00152)  (0.000199)  (0.000162) (3.11e-05) (0.000321)  (0.000315) 
Nb days since migrated sq  -1.05e-05*** -1.32e-06*** -7.75e-07***  -1.51e-07***  -2.16e-06***  -2.14e-06*** 
 (9.62e-07)  (1.24e-07)  (1.08e-07)  (2.12e-08) (2.13e-07) (2.09e-07) 
Cohort*nb days  0.0300**  0.00376**  -0.000106  -2.08e-05     
 (0.0126)  (0.00158)  (0.000798) (0.000156)     
Cohort*nb days sq  -4.27e-05**  -5.35e-06** -5.27e-08  -1.03e-08     
 (1.81e-05)  (2.27e-06)  (1.15e-06) (2.24e-07)     
Refugee Visa  2.959***  0.425***  0.260***  0.0552***  0.413***  0.410*** 
 (0.462)  (0.0755)  (0.0404)  (0.00930)  (0.0788)  (0.0782) 
Cohort*refugee -1.700  -0.190  -0.215** -0.0375**  -0.270  -0.268 
 (1.174)  (0.116) (0.107) (0.0166) (0.212) (0.209)
Value of funds transferred 
to Australia (logs)  -0.267*** -0.0335***  -0.0243***  -0.00475***  -0.0363***  -0.0360*** 
 (0.0624)  (0.00786)  (0.00591) (0.00115)  (0.0121) (0.0120) 
Income per week <$155  -0.326  -0.0405      -0.000157  -0.000156 
 (0.555)  (0.0680)     (0.0489)  (0.0485) 
Income per week [$155-
$385]  -1.372*** -0.167***      -0.0726*  -0.0720* 
 (0.445)  (0.0529)     (0.0394)  (0.0391) 
Income per week > $675  -0.121  -0.0151      0.196***  0.195*** 
 (0.453)  (0.0561)     (0.0442)  (0.0440) 
Highest Education level completed (reference: Bachelor degree)     
Primary School  2.362***  0.350**  0.0510  0.0102     
 (0.825)  (0.143)  (0.0366) (0.00754)     
Secondary School  0.640  0.0819  0.00784  0.00153     
 (0.499)  (0.0650)  (0.0213)  (0.00417)     
Trade qualification  0.927  0.124  0.00803  0.00158     
 (0.690)  (0.0984) (0.0309) (0.00609)    
Technical/ prof 
qualification  0.701 0.0910 0.00607  0.00119     
 (0.491)  (0.0659)  (0.0213)  (0.00417)     
Post graduate degree  0.914  0.123  0.0145  0.00285     
 (0.738)  (0.106) (0.0313) (0.00621)    
Higher degree  0.262  0.0334  -0.0255  -0.00493     
 (0.630)  (0.0819)  (0.0274)  (0.00523)     
Labour Force status in former country (reference: NLF)     
Business owner          0.0855*  0.0848* 
         (0.0489)  (0.0485) 
Wage earner          0.112***  0.111*** 
         (0.0340)  (0.0337) 
Unemployed         0.0714  0.0709 
         (0.0686)  (0.0680) 
Constant -23.21***  -2.527*** 2.476***   
 (2.113)    (0.123)    (0.229)   
Sigma 10.19***           
 (0.115)           
Athrho         2.718***   
         (0.118)   
Lnsigma         0.624***   
         (0.0246)   
Observations 13993  13993 13993 13993 13993  13993
Log likelihood  -11613  -11613  -7960  -7960  -7960  -7960 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
*p<0.1      31 
 
Table 10: Estimation result, Two-part model and Two-step selection model 
  Two part model  Heckman two-step 












Cohort  -0.514** -0.0870**  0.526*** -0.512** -0.0865** 0.509** 
  (0.255) (0.0376) (0.195) (0.247) (0.0362) (0.257)
Country of origin: (reference: Western Industrialized country)    
South America or Africa  0.530***  0.129***  -0.0640  0.525***  0.127***  0.0266 
 (0.115)  (0.0332)  (0.152)  (0.0843) (0.0245) (0.164) 
South Europe  0.453***  0.106***  0.0702  0.451***  0.105***  0.151 
 (0.114)  (0.0308)  (0.155)  (0.0867) (0.0236) (0.160) 
Eastern Europe  0.363***  0.0822***  -0.152  0.358***  0.0807***  -0.0883 
 (0.115)  (0.0298)  (0.154)  (0.0863) (0.0224) (0.147) 
Middle East  0.427***  0.0976***  0.110  0.427***  0.0973***  0.192 
 (0.112)  (0.0295)  (0.150)  (0.0833) (0.0220) (0.155) 
South East Asia  0.717*** 0.177*** 0.0339 0.715*** 0.176***  0.149
 (0.110)  (0.0326)  (0.145)  (0.0800) (0.0239) (0.184) 
North East Asia  0.325***  0.0709***  0.460***  0.316***  0.0685***  0.521*** 
 (0.112)  (0.0271)  (0.164)  (0.0826) (0.0200) (0.142) 
South Asia  0.766***  0.207***  0.140  0.765***  0.206***  0.258 
 (0.116)  (0.0391)  (0.154)  (0.0873) (0.0297) (0.194) 
Interaction country*cohort:        
Cohort* South America or Africa  -0.157  -0.0275  0.289  -0.166  -0.0290  0.262 
 (0.197)  (0.0314)  (0.225)  (0.171) (0.0268) (0.288) 
Cohort*South  Europe  -0.576*** -0.0799*** 0.0718  -0.579*** -0.0799***  -0.0160 
 (0.206)  (0.0189)  (0.247)  (0.174) (0.0159) (0.325) 
Cohort*Eastern Europe  -0.0521  -0.00975  0.396*  -0.0492  -0.00919  0.382 
 (0.208)  (0.0377)  (0.226)  (0.173) (0.0315) (0.293) 
Cohort*Middle East  -0.356*  -0.0557**  -0.0702  -0.374**  -0.0578***  -0.141 
 (0.201)  (0.0248)  (0.216)  (0.177) (0.0212) (0.319) 
Cohort*South East Asia  -0.282  -0.0465*  0.0855  -0.281*  -0.0461**  0.0246 
 (0.183)  (0.0252)  (0.203)  (0.151) (0.0208) (0.265) 
Cohort*North East Asia  -0.287  -0.0473*  -0.0696  -0.277*  -0.0458**  -0.0980 
 (0.194)  (0.0267)  (0.264)  (0.162) (0.0226) (0.295) 
Cohort*South Asia  -0.518**  -0.0722*** 0.164  -0.517***  -0.0719***  0.0742 
 (0.215)  (0.0200)  (0.246)  (0.200) (0.0185) (0.342) 
Labour Force Status in Australia (reference: not in labour force    
Business owner or self employed  0.177**  0.0375*  0.362**  0.158*  0.0329*  0.387*** 
 (0.0852)  (0.0196)  (0.148)  (0.0812) (0.0183) (0.124) 
Wage earner  0.421***  0.0881***  0.194***  0.419***  0.0875***  0.246** 
  (0.0435) (0.00995) (0.0749)  (0.0403) (0.00917) (0.105) 
Unemployed  -0.145*** -0.0262*** -0.00138  -0.147*** -0.0265***  -0.0134 
  (0.0510) (0.00869) (0.0679)  (0.0489) (0.00830) (0.0755) 
Cohort*Business -0.0476  -0.00892  -0.664  -0.0322  -0.00608  -0.692* 
 (0.210)  (0.0383)  (0.706)  (0.199) (0.0369) (0.390) 
Cohort*Wage  earner  0.138 0.0284  -0.193**  0.133 0.0273  -0.158 
  (0.0900) (0.0196) (0.0862) (0.0842) (0.0183) (0.142) 
Cohort*Unemployed  0.131 0.0272 0.161  0.134 0.0278 0.164 
 (0.146)  (0.0325)  (0.166)  (0.144) (0.0320) (0.269) 
Household size  -0.0351***  -0.00677*** -0.0191  -0.0346***  -0.00666***  -0.0242* 
 (0.00998)  (0.00192)  (0.0130)  (0.00872) (0.00168) (0.0140) 
Age at migration  0.0135  0.00260    0.0142*  0.00273*   
 (0.00900)  (0.00173)    (0.00802) (0.00154)   
Age at migration sq  -0.000312***-6.02e-05***   -0.000318***-6.12e-05***   
 (0.000109) (2.10e-05) (9.97e-05) (1.91e-05) 
Visited Australia prior to migration  -0.280***  -0.0513*** 0.109**  -0.281***  -0.0513***  0.0639 
  (0.0437) (0.00761) (0.0549)  (0.0372) (0.00644) (0.0788) 
Female -0.0345  -0.00664  -0.0667  -0.0341  -0.00654  -0.0628 
  (0.0356) (0.00684) (0.0508)  (0.0318) (0.00609) (0.0466) 
English language ability: (reference: Does not speak well)    
Speak very well  0.222***  0.0464***  0.0856  0.224***  0.0467***  0.115 
 (0.0527)  (0.0119)  (0.0622)  (0.0478) (0.0107) (0.0725) 32 
 
Speak well  0.158***  0.0313***  0.0646  0.160***  0.0315***  0.0805 
  (0.0395) (0.00804) (0.0466)  (0.0364) (0.00737) (0.0558) 
Does not speak at all  -0.0263  -0.00500  0.0433  -0.0323  -0.00611  0.0276 
  (0.0680) (0.0128) (0.0866) (0.0671) (0.0125) (0.102) 
Married 0.134***  0.0249***  -0.238***  0.132***  0.0246***  -0.223*** 
  (0.0395) (0.00711) (0.0489)  (0.0332) (0.00598) (0.0509) 
Nb days since migrated  0.00222*** 0.000428***0.000547*** 0.00223*** 0.000429***  0.000858*
 (0.000157)  (3.07e-05)  (0.000194) (0.000179)  (3.43e-05)  (0.000499) 
Nb days since migrated sq  -1.02e-06*** -1.96e-07*** -1.77e-07 -1.03e-06*** -1.97e-07*** -3.27e-07 
 (1.00e-07)  (1.95e-08)  (1.27e-07)  (1.17e-07) (2.28e-08) (2.61e-07) 
Cohort*nb days  0.00276**  0.000532**   0.00276*  0.000530*  0.0042 
 (0.00123)  (0.000236)    (0.00150)  (0.000288)  (0.002923) 
Cohort*nb days sq  -4.01e-06** -7.73e-07**   -4.03e-06*  -7.75e-07*  -5.52e-06 
 (1.76e-06)  (3.40e-07)    (2.15e-06) (4.12e-07) 4.15e-06 
Refugee Visa  0.305***  0.0650***  0.00300  0.303***  0.0643***  0.0356 
 (0.0493)  (0.0115)  (0.0630)  (0.0429)  (0.00998)  (0.0742) 
Cohort*refugee -0.207* -0.0358** -0.0674 -0.199* -0.0345**  -0.0854
 (0.117)  (0.0180)  (0.117)  (0.109) (0.0169) (0.177) 
Value of funds transferred to Australia 
(logs)  -0.0272*** -0.00523*** 0.0331***  -0.0268*** -0.00516***  0.0290** 
 (0.00622)  (0.00120)  (0.0127)  (0.00623) (0.00120) (0.0117) 
Highest Education level completed 
(reference: Bachelor degree) 
      
Primary School  0.241***  0.0525**    0.244***  0.0532***   
 (0.0870)  (0.0212)    (0.0740) (0.0180)   
Secondary School  0.0740  0.0145    0.0745*  0.0145*   
 (0.0522)  (0.0104)    (0.0446)  (0.00884)   
Trade  qualification  0.107 0.0219    0.105 0.0212   
 (0.0732)  (0.0157)    (0.0656) (0.0140)   
Technical/ prof qualification  0.0797  0.0158    0.0819*  0.0162*   
 (0.0515) (0.0105) (0.0452) (0.00922) 
Post graduate degree  0.0814  0.0164    0.0840  0.0169   
 (0.0778)  (0.0163)    (0.0667) (0.0140)   
Higher  degree  0.0260 0.00507    0.0209 0.00405   
 (0.0651)  (0.0129)    (0.0571) (0.0112)   
Income per week <$155      -0.0267    0  -0.0272 
     (0.0849)    (0)  (0.0807) 
Income per week [$155-$385]      -0.183***    0  -0.186*** 
     (0.0660)    (0)  (0.0613) 
Income per week > $675      0.311***    0  0.316*** 
     (0.0625)    (0)  (0.0578) 
Labour Force status in former country 
(reference: NLF)         
Business owner      0.0925    0  0.0936 
     (0.0806)    (0)  (0.0723) 
Wage earner      0.0919*    0  0.0947* 
     (0.0512)    (0)  (0.0488) 
Unemployed     -0.0223    0  -0.0169 
     (0.0949)    (0)  (0.101) 
Constant  -2.445***  7.203***  -2.458***  6.758*** 
   (0.208)    (0.189) (0.183)    (0.632) 
Observations 14006 14006 2275 13993 13993  13993
Ll -5104  -5104  -3006       
chi2 1612  1612    514.6  514.6  514.6 
Pseudo R2  0.178  0.178  0.190       
Lambda       0.166  0.166  0.166 
Selambda       0.241  0.241  0.241 
Sigma       0.921  0.921  0.921 
Rho       0.181  0.181  0.181 




Table 11: Difference in difference and cohort effects; conditional expectations 
Difference in difference and direct 
cohort effect  Remittances 
Cohort  0.509** 
South America or Africa 0.262 
South Europe  -0.0160 
Eastern Europe  0.382 
Middle East  -0.141 
South East Asia  0.0246 
North East Asia  -0.0980 
South Asia  0.0742 
Business owner, self employed  -0.692* 
Wage earner  -0.158 
Unemployed  0.164 
Refugee visa  -0.0854 
Time spent in Australia  0.0042 
  (0.002923) 
Time spent in Australia sq.  -5.52e-06 
  4.15e-06 
 
 
Table 12: Average levels of remittance by visa categories in 2000 AUD (with controls) 
  cohort 1  cohort 2 
Visa categories  wave 1  wave 2  wave 3  wave 4  wave 5 
Family  152.52 536.43 1066.5 153.13 585.51 
   (132.091) (368.169) (675.581) (154.934) (454.342) 
Business  232.35 731.24 1288.1 176.18  697.3 
   (205.505) (494.809) (669.848) (187.050) (600.001) 
Independent  336.89  1090.1 2058.28 321.95 1024.36 
   (285.509) (596.164) (883.364) (251.957) (596.219) 
Refugee  180.05 641.78 1305.9  70.51  342.19 
   (130.950) (411.263) (796.522)  (95.318)  (325.684) 
Total  183.94 633.60  1251.21  175.56 644.65 
   (173.287)  (454.027)  (801.845)  (188.88)  (525.09) 
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses 
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Table 13: Average Levels of remittances by country of origin in 2000 AUD (with controls) 
  cohort 1  cohort 2 
Country of origin  wave 1  wave 2  wave 3  wave 4  wave 5 
Oceania  72.65  330.54 645.18 153.90 564.24 
    (57.14)  (192.11) (374.78) (123.63) (332.13) 
South Europe  147.38 580.33  1255.41 82.74  394.66 
    (119.08) (406.63) (804.40)  (87.68)  (309.60) 
Western Europe  88.46  393.02 825.00 117.07 501.65 
   (69.29)  (207.92)  (405.26) (96.83) (324.48) 
Eastern E  87.75  391.23 821.81 227.51 840.06 
    (92.84)  (315.71) (558.86) (210.93) (577.40) 
Middle East  137.03 541.40  1125.75 90.47  348.25 
    (100.35) (369.78) (736.55)  (96.25)  (270.59) 
South East Asia  209.83  672.53 1293.05 264.22  875.63 
    (147.43) (381.98) (692.78) (223.01) (543.84) 
North East Asia  206.04  685.73 1335.19 131.13  545.52 
    (215.21) (529.63) (884.86) (146.39) (465.07) 
South Asia  337.32  997.50 1851.62 300.57 1116.32 
   (44.28)  (0.00)  (34.28) (155.22)  (107.51) 
North America  202.84  696.99 1270.32 155.19  664.95 
    (261.55) (603.92) (987.86) (240.45) (670.15) 
Great Britain, Ireland  53.46 436.33  949.74 32.09   
   (67.44)  (68.48)  (0.00)  (0.00)   
Central and South America  138.61  540.52 1084.35 250.90  962.33 
    (119.92) (374.79) (676.39) (215.18) (608.44) 
Africa  186.91  708.42 1183.55 304.11  889.60 
    (137.65) (433.09) (684.95) (233.41) (529.84) 
Total  183.94  633.60 1251.21 175.56  644.65 
  (173.29) (454.03) (801.84) (188.88) (525.09) 
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses 
Table 14: Average Levels of remittances by labour force status in 2000 AUD (with controls) 
  cohort 1  cohort 2 
Labour force status  wave  1 wave  2 wave  3 wave  1 wave  2 
        
Business owner  208.05 671.79  1336.43 54.12  242.42 
    (125.67) (318.36) (570.56)  (32.98)  (131.46) 
Wage earner  405.27 1099.24  1936.31 366.47 1126.56 
    (233.60) (445.58) (688.01) (203.50) (455.34) 
Other employed  107.16 383.60 741.02  71.05  326.45 
   (56.25)  (137.97)  (235.32) (58.25) (170.40) 
Unemployed  116.35 375.06 641.07  88.61  352.96 
   (66.12)  (153.92)  (217.90) (58.28) (188.96) 
Student  136.04 430.78 853.32  76.72  326.48 
   (73.23)  (171.08)  (278.27) (53.76) (163.80) 
Not in LF  108.88 336.15 622.33  70.85  258.48 
   (72.48)  (176.09)  (285.12) (61.45) (140.18) 
Total  183.94  633.60 1251.21 175.56  644.65 
    (173.29) (454.03) (801.84) (188.88) (525.09) 
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses 35 
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